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Chapter 2 Continued page 2 [of 3]
3.
Standardization: The current field structure, coupled with a lack of unified
national operations plans, has resulted in diversified and inconsistent
interpretation of policy and guidance within and between regions and
districts. Additionally, the
current performance measurement system creates an atmosphere of territoriality
rather than a unified, cooperative, effective, and efficient operation. DRO acknowledges that nationwide
operations cannot be conducted consistently without unified operations plans
and clear guidance to the field.
Developing a national fugitive operations policy, a national custody
management plan and a national transportation system are the program’s greatest
challenges and will prove to be among its greatest recent accomplishments when
complete. Development and
deployment of these national plans, as envisioned, will have significant
positive impact on DRO operations across the board. These national plans will not solve all program deficiencies
but will significantly reduce and minimize the gaps. Standard staffing guidelines and staffing levels are also
absent from the DRO personnel management system. Staff make-ups vary widely among and between like offices
throughout the country. Arguably,
offices should reflect the particular needs of their locale, but the
discrepancy in staffing levels and ratios, officer grade, and employee roles
and responsibilities creates anomalies in mission accomplishment and unfair
advantages and disadvantages to those competing for jobs.
4.
National Fleet System: Lacking a National Transportation Strategy and efficient
coordination, DRO spends millions of dollars annually for air and ground
transportation in order to manage the detention population and effect timely
removals. Likewise, as staffing
levels in other programs have increased, the DRO program has experience an
increased workload without the necessary increase in vehicles. Consequently, the lack of adequate
types and numbers of vehicles and a central movement control center handicaps
DRO in carrying out its mission as effectively and efficiently as it could.
5.
Alternatives to Detention: The DRO detained population has grown in both numbers and
diversity in recent years, yet detention methods needed to satisfy unique
demands have not kept pace. For
example, family groups are often held in hotels because there are not adequate
facilities available to house both adults and juveniles together.
6.
DHS Enforcement Initiatives: The DHS is currently implementing and
making plans to implement several enforcement initiatives and programs that,
when fully operational, will generate increased demands do not come with
increased DRO resources. DRO
cannot fully support these programs, and they will not be as effective as
intended, without a commensurate increase in personnel and infrastructure. These programs are the Student
Exchange and Visitor Program (SEVP) and the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT).
7.
Workforce Development: The DHS operates and maintains an intensive course of
instruction for new officers and recruits. The academies provide 11-, 16-, and 21-week courses designed
to provide officers with the core competencies needed to begin their work at
their duty location. The officers
do, however, require a period of on-the-job training before they are fully effective
in their assigned duties.
Unfortunately, DRO does not have an advanced or professional development
program of equal caliber. Officers
do not have a “career advancement” template to follow and, due to the
operational tempo and shortfall in human resources, officers are often not
relieved from duty to attend professional development training. This, along with several other factors,
has had a detrimental affect on retention rates within the DRO officer
corps. The low retention rate is
further exacerbated, as the hiring and training process is extremely slow and
cumbersome; officers are not trained and put in place before existing staff is
burnt out and eventually leaves the program.
8. Institutional
Removal Program (IRP): The
IRP, as currently executed, is inefficient
and less
effective than it should be because the responsibility for operational
execution lies
with the investigations program (identifying and processing incarcerated
aliens) and the responsibility for results lies with the Detention and Removal
program (removing criminal aliens), the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and
the Office of the Inspector General have clearly cited a workforce shortfall to
handle the significant workload.
As the War on Terror continues to be waged, the Special Agents who have
been supporting the IRP are being pulled from the program to work other high
profile cases related to ‘homeland security.” These positions and IRP work left unaccomplished by these
special agents are not being back filled, increasing the risk of releasing
criminal aliens into the community.
9. Inadequate Information Technology to Support DRO
Operations: The Deportable Alien
10.
Aging and Inadequate Infrastructure for Detention
Operations: Historically,
funding
For repair, construction, and alternation has not been
adequate to support our Service Processing Centers (SPCs). Funding for construction projects has
routinely been reduced and/or eliminated over the last several years. This has made it extremely difficult to
support our detention operation and to keep up with the technological / design
/ procedural advancements the “prison” industry affords. While most of our facilities have
portions of new construction, our facilities generally need significant
physical improvements. This is not
to say that any of our facilities are in “poor condition.” Our staff goes to great lengths to
ensure the health, safety and welfare of the staff, detainees, and general
public. Facilities like Florence,
El Centro, El Paso, and Port Isabel, when originally constructed years ago,
were designed to hold relatively small non-criminal populations for short
periods of time. Over the last 5
years, our population has increased by 136%, and the classification of our
population has gone from primarily non-criminal to a population of over 65%
criminal, some requiring a maximum-security setting. As an agency, we have had a relatively short period of time
and little funding to keep up with the growth and the special needs of this
disparate population.
11.
September 11 Unfunded Mandates: Since September 11, 2001, policy and
activity has subjected DRO to q w34i3w or unfunded mandates, taking resources
away from the accomplishment of other critical operations. Throughout the past year, the
Administration, the Department of Justice and Congress have initiated several
programs in response to gaps revealed by September 11 findings. These have forced the program into a
reactive role, thereby redirecting our proactive initiatives and planning. Programs such as the Alien Absconder
Initiative and the Custody Review Unit, while extremely beneficial in securing
America’s borders, have not been resourced to the extent that optimum benefit
can be realized.
12.
Lack of Immigration Enforcement Mission Are Plan: As the title of this plan implies DRO
provides the final step in the immigration enforcement process. The Department does not yet have, in
place, a tool, method or process to ensure that strategies, budgets and
operations planned for and executed by other enforcement programs consider the
impact to DRO and the ensuing operational implications and resource
requirements.
13.
Non-detained docket: The Detention and Removal program does not have a program to
effectively manage its non-detained docket. The appearance rate of individuals released from ICE custody
is estimated to be 15 percent and the program does not have the resources to
identify, locate, apprehend and process the remaining 85%.
DRO is currently working on several short-and long-term initiatives
that are proving to be excellent opportunities to continue it’s progress in
implementing this plan and achieving its vision and mission. The proper use of information
technology is critical to program success and DRO is working with the Office of
Information Resource Management (OIRM) to replace the Deportable Alien Control
System with the Removal Module (EREM) of the Enforcement Case Tracking System
(ENFORCE). The EREM will draw from
many more databases and sources than DACS. It is expected that EREM will facilitate the automation and
subsequent improvement of many DRO efforts and procedures. Other initiatives include the
implementation of the National Fugitive Operations Plan, the reorganization
of District DRO operations who control Service Processing Centers
(SPCs), unilateral management of the Institutional Removal Program
(IRP), revision of the Field Officer’s Manual, an initiative to reengineer the
bond management program, development of a central ticketing program to
coordinate all escort missions, and implementation of various electronic
monitoring programs. All of these
initiatives are layers deep and include the creation of training and
professional development programs, increased staffing levels and greater
stakeholder cooperation and involvement.
In addition to these initiatives, other strategies within this plan,
current events, political will, and public interest provide the program with an
array of opportunities from which it cannot turn away. DRO will exploit every opportunity
presented in order to build the capacity to remove all removable aliens.
1. Human Resource
Shortfall: The workload per case
officer is daunting and the pool of removable aliens continues to grow as other
immigration enforcement divisions became more effective, apprehending greater
numbers of individuals, and as aliens continue to find ways to enter the country illegally. The detention and removal mission is
manpower intensive and very few functions can be automated. Therefore, the success of the missions
relies heavily on available human resources and their capabilities. DRO will work diligently to close the gap
between its workforce is productive, efficient and effective, DRO will
implement strategies to training programs, create professional development
programs, and build the infrastructure (information technology, transportation,
facilities) essential to facilitate the detention and remove
process.
2. Institutional
Removal Program (IRP): The
IRP, as currently executed, is inefficient and less effective than it should be
because the responsibility for operational execution lies with the
Investigations program (identifying and processing incarcerated aliens) and the
responsibility for results lies with the Detention and Removal program (remove
criminal aliens). To reduce the
inefficiencies in the program, in September 2000 the Office of Field Operations
mandated the transition of the IRP from Investigations to Detention and
Removal. Consolidation of IRP will
allow senior management to focus on and resolve the program deficiencies
identified in the 1997 and 1998 GAO reports. These efficiencies will permit more aliens to be processed
while incarcerated, thereby reducing the potential demand for detention
space. Overall, improved
effectiveness of the IRP will increase the public safety, reduce the potential
for future crimes, and enhance the welfare of our society. DRO is working with the Investigations
Program to either identify resources to be transferred with the IRP or to
acquire additional resources to merge and execute the program.
3. DEO/IEA
Reclassification: Creation of the
Immigration Enforcement Agent (IEA), with a journeyman-level at GS-9, will make this
entry-level position a true foundation for an officer’s career
development. This new career
position will strengthen the overall professionalism of the DRO workforce and
will afford those who are interested with the opportunity to apply for any of
the senior officer positions, thereby continuing their career growth within the
Division and Department.
Establishment of this position will create a corps of nearly 2,300 IEAs
with arrest authority and authority to issue detainers. This increased workforce will create a
pool of officers that can effectively execute the IRP. If this corps of officers works the IRP
25% of their time (as is expected to meet the requirements of the new
classification and grade), we will have, in effect, almost 600 full time
equivalent positions (FTE) dedicated to the IRP, which is nearly double the
current IEA FTE. By doubling the
effective IRP workforce, we can expect a significant increase in criminal
removals as more incarcerated removable aliens are processed and deported. This increased effectiveness will also
reduce the number of persons placed in ICE detention, thus reducing avoidable
detention costs.
4. National Fugitive Operations
Program (NFOP)/Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI): In response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Congress passed legislation providing funding and positions
for the role of law enforcement agencies in the war against terrorism. As part of that legislation, DRO was
authorized an enhancement of 40 positions solely for the purpose of
apprehending fugitive aliens.
Seven districts were assigned these positions to create a Fugitive
Operations Section for the purpose of implementing the NFOP. The Absconder Apprehension Initiative
announced in the Deputy Attorney General’s directive of January 25, 2002, indicated
that there is a backlog of cases with unexecuted orders of removal. The NFOP will target this backlog by
facilitating the apprehension and subsequent removal of those fugitives. The goal over the next ten years will
be to eliminate this backlog and to ensure that our efforts in terms of
apprehension and removal of fugitive cases equals the number of new cases
falling into this category. While
woefully in adequate to achieve the goal, the creation of 40 positions
dedicated to the NFOP us a promising start.
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